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REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES. By Jack 
B. Weinstein.* Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio. 1977, 
Pp. 216. Reviewed by Julius Isaacson.t 
As the title of this well-annotated and indexed book suggests, its 
author, Jack B. Weinstein, is not content with present rule-making 
procedures of this nation's courts. His book first traces the historical 
development of present day practices and then offers suggestions for 
their improvement. Though disenchanted with the current rule-
making process, Judge Weinstein balances his concerns by calling 
particular attention to the advantages of sound judicial rules, which 
until now have allowed courts to meet growing administrative 
pressures. He particularly notes the efficiencies that have been 
achieved in the face of our nation's increasing resort to the 
courtroom for resolution of complex, modern problems and the 
flexibility of the courts in accommodating an increasing caseload. 
Good rules, he observes, eliminate or reduce research time, proce-
dural uncertainty, and appeals and reversals on non-substantive 
points. 
In a chapter on develop'ment of national rule-making power, 
Judge Weinstein, who for six years by appointment of Chief Justice 
Warren served on the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, traces the evolution of rule-making power from early 
English experience when the King used courts to expand his control 
over nobility. He recounts, for example, the origin of the writ of 
certiorari as the King's prerogative to review records of his courts, 
and then details subsequent development leading to independence 
for these common law and equity courts. Judge Weinstein does not 
envision serio1,ls obstacles to further reform in this country as there 
are no constitutional, theoretical, or historicai barriers to change. In 
fact, as he carefully observes, the federal rule-making power is not 
an inherent judicial power but is a power granted by Congress under 
specific limitations. 
Judge Weinstein is troubled principally by the undemocratic 
way rule-making power has come to be exercised. In contrast, he 
holds up the legislative enactment process where there are hearings 
and debates, and the public is invited to present its views before a 
bill is enacted into law. Yet, as Judge Weinstein points out, all of 
these procedures are entirely lacking in the court rule-making 
process in which judges get together, decide on rules and then 
announce them as faits accomplis. He describes this as the 
"impenetrability" of the court's rule-making process (p. 101). In 
Judge Weinstein's opinion, there are now clear signals that changes 
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are needed in the way rules for courts are developed. He argues that 
ideology has succumbed to practicality and that both courts and 
legislatures must assume an active role in the rule-making process. 
Judge Weinstein defines court rule-making as the curious 
phenomenon where courts control court procedure and related 
matters by rules promulgated by the court and adds that such rule-
making is being exercised increasingly at national, state, and local 
levels, the process presenting substantial advantages and serious 
dangers. Believing that we are now at a crucial juncture, he devotes 
the entirety of chapter four to his primary thrust, that is, methods of 
achieving national rule-making reform. The author first discusses 
congressional power to delegate and modify terms of delegation, 
making reference to an early Supreme Court case l where for the first 
time the Court's rule-making powers were reviewed and upheld as a 
proper legislative delegation. This is followed by an interesting 
analysis of the 1941 Sibbach v. Wilson & CO.2 case where the Court, 
faced with the question of the validity of certain Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, held that Congress has undoubted power to regulate 
the practice and procedure of federal courts either directly or by 
delegation to the courts. The author then sets forth practical 
objections to this unrestrained exercise of delegated rule-making 
power by the Supreme Court and follows with proposals for 
modification of the national rule-making process itself. One proposal 
calls for the reinvolvement of the legislative branch in order to 
restore some of the checks and balances originally established in our 
democratic system. Judge Weinstein also supports three recommen-
dations made by Professor Howard Lesnick, professor of law at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School: judicial conference proce-
dures should be more open and should be published; the composition 
of the advisory committees should be more representative; and the 
assignment of the rule-promulgating role to the Supreme Court, 
being unwise and inappropriate, should be r(!examined. The latter 
recommendation is grounded in the author's belief that it is improper 
for a body instrumental in the adoption of rules to be empowered to 
pass upon the validity and constitutionality of those same rules. The 
author is also critical of the individual federal courts which have 
had rule-making power from their inception and where judges, 
almost without exception, merely consult with one another in 
promulgating local rules. The bar, law schools, and the citizenry are 
given no opportunity to comment on proposed drafts of these local 
rules. Since rules having a great impact on the public are involved 
(e.g., jury size, sentencing policy, class action policy, media access, 
bar admissions), democratization of the rule-making process here too 
is a necessity (p. 119). 
1. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825). 
2. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
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In the close 'ofthis interesting text, Judge Weinstein summarizes 
his own recommendations for change in the national rule-making 
process: that the Supreme Court should not adopt any rules for any 
court except itself; that Congress should continue to have the power 
to reject any rule or amendment promulgated by the Court; that 
Congress should refrain from redrafting details of a rule; that the 
United States Judicial Conference should take the place of the 
Supreme Court as the national rule-making authority and that the 
Standing Committee should widely publicize the proposals of its 
advisory committee and hold public hearings before recommending 
adoption to the Judicial Conference. The author makes these 
valuable recommendations to answer and eliminate justifiable 
criticism of the local rule-making and guideline-making process. 
The bench, bar, and general public should be deeply indebted to 
Judge Weinstein for writing this book. Eventually his suggestions 
for the reform of court rule-making procedures will be adopted or will 
stimulate necessary change from which all will benefit. His book is 
in harmony with the present, enlightened view that the public's 
right to know extends to the rule-making power of the judiciary now 
exercised in their inner chambers. 
